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Abstract 
 
Defined benefit (DB) plans and defined contribution (DC) plans are the two main types of 
retirement pensions sponsored by US employers. This paper explores the choices made by 
employees in a non-profit firm when offered the option of switching from a DB to a DC plan. 
Overall, half of the employees switched into the DC plan and half stayed with the DB. We find 
that both demographic and economic factors affected an employee’s plan switch decisions. We 
also find that the default option – by making no active election an employee remained in the old 
DB plan – had an important impact on some employees’ retirement savings. Surprisingly, half of 
the employees under age of 40 who could potentially benefit more from the DC plan defaulted to 
the DB plan, and the DB defaulters were more similar to the DC switchers than DB choosers. 
According to the employer’s calculation, altogether the defaulted employees with positive 
opportunity costs have forgone $7M, or 37 percent of their annual salary. Among those who 
switched to the DC plan, the contribution rates were affected by the DC plan match formula, the 
employee’s age, salary, and other saving. Given the actual behavior of those who switched, there 
was virtually no change in employer pension expenses after the switch. 
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 Since the 1980s, defined contribution (DC) plans have become critically important 
mechanisms for retirement provision.1 There are several explanations for the trend toward DC 
plans.2 First, some employers are reluctant to launch new defined benefit (DB) plans because of 
relatively high and rising expenses. Second, DC plans have flourished due to their appeal to both 
employers and employees. 3 Third, some employers have felt the need to shift risk from the firms 
to employees. Although DC plans have many advantages compared to DB plans, this does not 
necessarily mean that DC plans are superior for everyone.4 The major advantage of DB plans is 
their potential to provide a stable income replacement rate, with capital market and longevity risk 
borne by employers. DB plans might be a good choice for stable employees, those who are less 
financially sophisticated, and those who are unwilling to take investment risk.  
Because theory fails to show either plan type’s superiority, we turn to empirical evidence 
to ascertain how employees make one of their most important financial decisions — choosing a 
retirement plan — when offered a one-time option to switch from a DB to a DC pension plan. 
We are also interested in the “default effect”, i.e., if an employee did not affirmatively elect any 
plan by a certain date, he would remain in the old DB plan.  In this paper, we explore several 
questions using a rich, unique dataset provided by a large non-profit organization. First, which 
employees switched from the DB to the DC plan, and how did they compare to those who did 
not?  Second, were the defaulters different from those who actively selected the DB plan? How 
much money was potentially given up as a result of not switching to the DC plan? Why did so 
many young employees default to the DB plan when they potentially could obtain higher benefit 
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from the DB plan? Third, how did the DC switchers determine their contribution rates to the new 
DC plan? Fourth, how did employee choices influence the employer’s pension expenses? 
 The results show that half of the employees switched into the DC plan and half stayed 
with the DB plan. We find that both demographic and economic factors affected an employee’s 
plan switch decisions. Female, white, higher-income, non-unionized, and longer-service 
employees were more likely to choose the DC plan. Employees also favored the DC plan if they 
had past experience with DC-type retirement saving plans and if it was easy for the projected DC 
benefit to catch up to the projected DB benefit.  
The default option had an important impact on some employees’ plan choice and 
retirement savings. Surprisingly, about half of the employees under the age of 40 who could 
potentially benefit more from the DC plan defaulted to the DB plan, and the DB defaulters were 
more similar to the DC switchers than DB choosers. According to the employer’s calculation, 
altogether the defaulted employees with positive opportunity costs have given up $7M, or 40 
percent of their annual salary. Among those who switched into the DC plan, older, higher-
income, non-African American, and employees with previous DC saving tended to have higher 
contribution rates. Given the actual behavior of those who switched, there was virtually no 
change in employer pension expenses after the switch. 
  This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Not only do we examine 
how demographic factors affect employee retirement plan choices, but we also explore the 
employee responses to the economic incentives characterized by the internal rate of return and 
projected benefit difference between the DC and the DB plans. We find that, in general, an 
employee is more likely to switch to the DC plan if it is easier for his DC benefits to catch up to 
the old DB benefits. Furthermore, this paper explores a new facet of passive choices in 
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retirement savings: how default options influence pension plan choice. We find that many 
employees, especially the young, made passive choices and in doing so gave up a large amount 
of pension benefits. Last but not least, we investigate the contribution decisions of switched 
employees, and the actual influence of employee choices on employer pension expenses, two 
topics little examined in previous research.   
 This research may also shed some light on possible Social Security reform. If part of the 
Social Security payroll tax could be deposited into a personal account,5 policymakers should 
know who might be more likely to set up such an individual account, how a default option might 
influence their decisions, and what determines individuals’ contribution rates. This paper could 
help answer these questions.  
 In what follows, first, we describe previous research on the choice between DB and DC 
plans. Next we summarize the plan switch option offered by the large non-profit organization. 
Then we construct empirical models to explore how the employees made their decisions and 
present the corresponding empirical results. Finally, we conclude and discuss policy 
implications.  
 
1. Previous Studies on Employee Plan Choices 
 Before reviewing the literature, it is helpful to outline the features of DB and DC plans. A 
DB plan rewards long service and pays a benefit that depends on final salary. Accordingly, a DB 
plan participant faces job change risk and employer default risk. If an employee leaves his 
employer prior to retirement, the DB benefit is usually frozen without any future indexation. 
Consequently, when the benefit is sought at the time of retirement, it will have been heavily 
eroded by inflation. This problem is serious for young employees, both because the backloading 
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feature of the DB plan gives them low benefits at leaving, and because of the long time before 
retirement. It is also possible that a bankrupted firm may default on its DB pension benefit 
promises.6 By contrast, in a DC plan, the employer stipulates contribution amounts rather than 
benefit formulas. Consequently, a participant’s risk in this case comes from the investment return 
of employee accounts. After the contribution rate has been decided, the DC accumulation 
depends heavily on the investment performance of the employee’s total portfolio. Termination 
does not threaten DC participants particularly, because DC participants can always rollover their 
account into an IRA (or to a new employer’s DC plan); consequently, the money can continue to 
accrue investment returns.  
 DC plans became popular in the United States after the passage of the Revenue Act of 
1978; thereafter, increasing numbers of employers redesigned their retirement offerings by 
moving to DC plans. Some employers chose to supplement their old DB plans with new DC 
plans, usually contributory with an employer match. In other cases, employers let their 
employees choose between the old DB plan and a new DC plan. This choice was often given to 
the new hires, 7 but some employers, like the one in this paper, allowed current employees to 
switch plans.8  
Several theoretical studies explore the tradeoffs between DB and DC plans as well as 
participants’ optimal selections (See Table 1). Bodie, Marcus, and Merton (1988) employ a 
three-period model to explore the influence of wage and interest rate uncertainty on DB and DC 
plans. By maximizing the utility of a representative worker subject to the constraint that both DB 
and DC plans have equal costs to the firm, they conclude that DB plans are not dominated by DC 
plans, since a DB plan offers workers a stable replacement rate of final income and some degree 
of insurance against real wage risk. DC plans also possess some advantages over DB plans, 
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namely the predictability of the value of pension wealth, the ability to invest in inflation-hedged 
portfolios rather than nominal DB annuities, and (possibly) a fully-funded promise. McCarthy 
(2003) examines the value of a DB plan using a multi-period analysis, in which he incorporates 
wage uncertainty, market volatility, and mortality risk, allowing investment choice to change 
dynamically and endogenously. His paper suggests that wage-indexed claims offered by DB 
plans are more valuable when the employees are old, when equity markets provide low expected 
returns or are highly variable, and when annuity markets are inefficient. Childs et al. (2002) 
examine optimal retirement plan choices between DB and DC plans using a real options 
framework, taking into account employees’ option to change employers in the future. The 
authors model an employee’s current salary as well as a best alternative salary from changing 
employers, and they treat these two salaries as following a separate but possibly correlated 
diffusion process. The representative employee in this model chooses between a DB or DC plan 
using backward induction, by maximizing the sum of the present value of his remaining lifetime 
salary plus the present value of expected benefits received from the retirement plan at each node 
of a trinomial tree, a decision tree built from the drift and variance of the ratio of the current 
salary to the best alternative salary. Numerically simulating three hypothetical workers age 25, 
40, and 55, the paper finds that, for reasonable parameter values, DC plans are preferred by 
young employees and employees with higher turnover rates, higher risk aversion, and higher 
employer contribution rates. Employees with more years of service and higher accrued DB 
benefits are more likely to stay in the old DB plan.  
Table 1 here 
To summarize, existing theoretical studies predict several hypotheses for us to test in our 
empirical analysis. First, because the fact that DC plans can better hedge job change risk, 
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employees more likely to change jobs prefer DC plans. Second, the backloading feature of DB 
plans makes employees with more service and higher accrued benefits prefer DB plans. Third, 
young employees prefer DC plans because of their higher job change probabilities and the DC 
plan’s capability to help them diversify total portfolio risk when most of their assets are in 
human capital.  
There are only a few empirical studies on employee plan choices. One, by Papke (2004), 
explores the DB and DC plan choices made by corrections workers covered by the Michigan 
State Employee Retirement System. The paper finds a relatively low switch rate among 
correction workers: only 1.6 percent, lower than the 5.5 percent for all Michigan public 
employees. Papke (2004) finds that age and salary were not the determinants of plan switch 
decision; however, plan vesting, which enabled a worker to transfer the present value of accrued 
DB benefits to the DC plan, had a significantly positive influence on the switch decision. Brown 
et al. (2004) seek to answer the question of why only one-third of existing employees in the 
Superannuation Scheme for Australian Universities switched to a DC from a DB plan. Based on 
152 responses to 620 surveys, they conclude that “risk transfer costs” deterred employees from 
switching to the DC plan. The risk transfer costs referred to “any costs associated with risks that 
transfer from the employer to the employee when employees shift from a defined benefit to an 
accumulation plan [DC plan], and any newly arising risks borne by employees when they 
transfer” (P. 6). Limited by their data, neither study explores how the employees responded to 
the economic incentives, for example, the projected benefit amounts. Nor do they investigate the 
influences of the default effect as well as the switched employees’ saving behavior.  
Two other related papers, by Clark, Harper, and Pitts (1997) and Clark, Ghent, and 
McDermed (2003), evaluate how newly hired North Carolina State University faculty chose 
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between the state public DB plan and several DC plans. Their surveys of the faculty hired 
between 1971-1995 and 1983-2001 show that older, female, and black newly hired faculty were 
more likely to select the DB plan. The papers also find that mobility expectations, labor market 
conditions, faculty rank, and type of appointment all had an impact on plan choice. Their work 
differs from our research since we focus on the plan choices of current employees offered a one-
time opportunity to switch from a DB to a DC plan, not on the plan choices of new hires.  
A handful of other studies describe existing employees’ plan choices, but none of them 
links these choices to employee characteristics. A consistent finding is that relatively few people 
seem to switch to DC plans: for instance, fewer than 10 percent of Florida state employees chose 
the DC plan when given the choice in 2001, while over 80 percent defaulted to the old DB plan 
(Feinberg, 2004).9 Similarly, only 10 percent of existing employees at Florida Daytona Beach 
Community College facing a DC/DB election selected the DC plan, while 80 percent of new 
employees elected the DB option (Trager, Francis, and SigRist, 2001). In a large electronics 
company, only one-third of employees chose to switch to a DC plan when the employer offered a 
DB/DC choice (Rappaport, 2004). A large health care employer who offered the option to switch 
to a new DC plan found that only 20 percent of employees took the option, while the rest either 
selected or defaulted to the DB plan (Rappaport 2004). These studies paint a general picture of 
how employees behave when offered a switch, but they do not reveal the determinants of plan 
choices, nor do they indicate switched employees’ saving rates.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. Unlike previous studies, we not 
only examine how demographic factors affect employee retirement plan choices, but we also 
explore the employee responses to the economic incentives characterized by the internal rate of 
return and projected benefit difference between the DC and the DB plans. Furthermore, this 
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paper explores a new facet of passive choices in retirement savings: how default options 
influence pension plan choice, how much money was given up by the defaulted employees, and 
why so many young employees defaulted to the DB plan. Finally, we investigate the contribution 
decisions of switched employees, and the actual influence of employee choices on employer 
pension expenses, two topics little examined in previous research.  
 
2. The Plan Switch and the Data 
Prior to the year 2000, the firm we studied offered a DB pension to its weekly paid, full-
time employees. The annual benefit amount was specified by the following formula: 
DB Benefit=1.25% • Final Average Pay • Years of Service, 
where the final average pay (FAP) represents the average of an employee’s highest five years of 
earnings in the last 10 years of work while in the DB plan. The DB plan was non-contributory, 
and vesting occurred after the participant completed at least 1000 hours of service per year for 
five years.10 The DB participants were also allowed to contribute to a Supplemental Retirement 
Annuity (SRA), a DC-type pre-tax retirement saving account. 
In the late 1990s, some employees contended that the DB plan offered a potentially lower 
benefit than that provided by a DC plan.11 For example, the DB plan did not have immediate 
vesting and portability, nor did it offer employees the chance to make their own investment 
decisions. Nevertheless, the DB plan was attractive since it did not require employee 
contributions, while the DC plan did require direct employee contributions in order to be eligible 
for the employer match. Of course, from an employer’s perspective, a DC plan has its own 
appeal. A DC plan is easier to communicate and administer, while its expenses are more 
predictable than those of the DB plan. Moreover, offering a DC plan to all might help the 
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employer pass the legally required non-discrimination tests, which require qualified retirement 
plans not to discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees (i.e., in the year 2000, 
anyone earning over $85,000). For all these reasons, the decision to redesign the retirement plans 
was seen as accommodating both employee and employer interests. 
 In March of 2000, the firm offered a one-time opportunity to this group of employees to 
switch from the old DB plan to a new DC plan. The DC setup had three layers of contributions. 
First, the firm provided everyone who selected the DC plan with a “basic” age-based 
contribution, which did not require any employee contribution. This was worth 1 percent of pay 
for those younger than age 30, 3 percent of pay for those age 30 to 39, and 4 percent of pay for 
those age 40 and over. This contribution would begin after one year of service. Second, 
employees were also permitted to make voluntary contributions up to the maximum allowable 
contribution amount under federal law and regulations.12 In 2000, the annual employee 
contributions to the DC-type plans generally could not exceed the lesser of $10,500 or 20 percent 
of salary. All employee contributions were vested immediately. Third, if an employee made a 
voluntary contribution to the DC plan, the employer would provide a dollar-for-dollar match up 
to 5 percent of salary. Employees could begin to contribute immediately at hire, while the 
employer match would begin after a year of service.  
 The switch option given to the DB participants was one-time and irrevocable, with all 
decisions required to be made before June 1, 2000.  In March of that year, the Human Resources 
Department prepared a Plan Decision Kit for all eligible employees, which included the 
following components: 
• Retirement Plan Decision Guide – a description of the important features of both plans 
and instructions on how to make an election. 
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• Personalized Illustration of Annual Retirement Benefits – a personalized benefit sheet 
that provided an estimated comparison of a given employee’s projected benefits from the 
DB and DC plans. These computations assumed the employee would stay at the firm for 
another 10, 15, and 20 years, or until age 65 (See Appendix 1).  
• Mutual Fund Provider’s Enrollment Kits – two kits providing detailed information about 
DC plan investment options from two mutual fund companies. 
• Special Retirement Plan Election Form – a form to be filled in and returned by each 
employee to show his plan decision. 
• DC Plan Election Form – an additional form only for an employee who decided to switch 
to the DC plan. 
• A prepaid envelope. 
Besides the Plan Decision Kit, the employer provided additional services to assist employee 
decision making. In addition to reviewing the Personalized Illustration of Annual Retirement 
Benefits based on common assumptions for everybody, employees could access an online 
program to evaluate the effect of changing assumptions such as retirement age or investment 
returns. The Human Resources Department, with one of the mutual fund providers, also held 
several group and individual meetings to explain the DB and DC plan features and answer 
employee questions.  
 Every employee was required to complete the Special Retirement Plan Election Form and 
return it to the Human Resources Department no later than June 1, 2000. If the election form was 
not received by that date, the employee forfeited his one-time opportunity to join the DC plan 
and would remain in the DB plan, or in other words, he would default to the DB plan. In this 
event, his benefits would be decided by the DB formula at retirement. Employees who switched 
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to the DC plan were asked to specify their contribution rates and asset allocation decisions; 
otherwise, the employer’s basic contributions defaulted into the money market fund only, and 
additional employee contributions as well as the employer’s match were set at zero. Switched 
employees’ accrued, vested DB benefits were frozen as of June 1, 2000.13  
 The dataset provided by the employer contains information on 3,535 employees eligible 
to make the plan switch. The file indicates each employee’s plan decision, i.e., whether he chose 
to switch to the DC plan, elected to stay in the DB plan, or defaulted into the DB plan. For those 
who switched to the DC plan, we also know their contribution rates. Moreover, the dataset 
provides employee characteristics including age, salary, years of service with the employer, sex, 
education, ethnicity, bargaining unit, and division information (See Table 2).  
Table 2 and Figure 1 here 
 Table 2 and Figure 1 show that about half of the 3,535 employees elected to switch to the 
DC plan, a switch rate higher than in any other study described in the literature to date. Of the 
1,784 employees who remained in the DB plan, two-thirds of this group, or one-third of all 
employees, defaulted into the DB plan. Only 221 of those eligible (6 percent of all employees) 
actively selected the DB plan.14 Employee plan choices across age groups are shown in Figure 2, 
where we see that the switch rate is higher for employees in their 30s and 40s, but lower for 
employees older than 50. The most surprising result comes from the group in their 20s, whose 
switch rate was only 40 percent, far below the employer’s expectation of 80 percent. For the 
employees who switched into the DC plan, the average pre-tax contribution rate of all 
participants was 6 percent of salary. 
A representative employee was 41 years old, with an annual salary of $28,000 and 9 
years of service with the employer. There were fewer males (40 percent) than females. Only 
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about one-quarter had college degrees; some 44 percent had no college degree, and for the 
remaining 31 percent, education information was lacking. Regarding ethnicity, 46 percent of the 
employees were White, 35 percent were African-American, and 5 percent were Native-
American, Asian-American and Hispanic; for 14 percent ethnicity information was lacking.15 
About a quarter of the employees were union members, and they belonged to 10 different 
bargaining units. On average, these employees had accrued a DB lifetime annuity worth about 
$3,060 per year, which could be collected only at retirement. Athough each employee had the 
option of saving pre-tax salary through the Supplementary Retirement Annuity, only 18 percent 
actually had put any money into the SRA account; the average contribution rate was 6 percent 
among employees with positive contribution rates.  
To examine the switch decision, we use projected benefit values calculated by the 
employer and provided to the participants in the Personalized Illustration of Annual Retirement 
Benefits in the Plan Decision Kit. The average DC and DB benefit difference was $3,290 in 
annuity terms, assuming that the employee retired at the age of 65.16 In an unreported table, we 
find that younger employees would benefit more from the DC plan, since both their contribution 
and investment periods were much longer than for older employees. Consequently, with the 
above assumptions, their DC plan benefits had the potential to exceed the DB plan benefits. As 
age increased, the benefit difference decreased, both because the DC plan contribution and 
investment period was shorter, and because the back-loading feature of the DB plan made the 
DB benefit rise quickly. On average, if an employee was older than 45, his projected DB benefits 
would be higher than his projected DC benefits. 
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3. Empirical Models and Results 
 In what follows, we focus on how the employees chose between the DB and the DC plans 
at this non-profit firm. Specifically, we ask which employees switched from the DB to the DC 
plan, how they compared to those who did not, and whether employees who defaulted to the DB 
plan differed from those who actively chose the DB plan. Further, we ask what the opportunity 
costs were for the DB defaulters, especially those young defaulters, and what the potential 
reasons were for them to fall in to the default. Next, for those employees who switched to DC 
plan, we examine how they determined their contribution rates. Finally, we explore the pension 
expense changes for the employer as the result of switch behavior of the employees.  
 
3.1 Employee Plan Choice Behavior 
 To explore who switched to the DC plan, we compare them to the employees staying in 
the DB plan. We test the hypotheses noted above regarding the relationship between plan type 
and employee age, service, and DB accumulations.  In addition to these factors, we hypothesize 
that other economic factors, including projected benefit differences between the DC and DB 
plans, the Internal Rate of Return (IRR), 17 salary and other saving, and demographic factors 
(including gender, education, and bargaining unit) influence plan selection outcomes. The 
projected benefits of the DB plan and projected benefits of the DC plan for each employee were 
adapted from the Personalized Illustration of Annual Retirement Benefits. 
 In particular, we hypothesize that an employee is more likely to switch to the DC plan if 
his projected DC plan benefit is higher than his projected DB plan benefit. Therefore, the 
projected benefit difference, (DC-DB), is predicted to have a positive influence on employees’ 
switch decisions. We hypothesize that employees with a higher salary should also be more likely 
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to switch to the DC plan, both because their liquidity constraints may not be very tight, and 
because a higher income might enable an individual to bear more risk by providing a cushion for 
bad DC portfolio returns.18  It is well recognized that women are more likely to have an 
interrupted employment and salary history than men because of family burdens. Conditional on 
pay, therefore, we hypothesize that women would prefer the DC over the DB plan, because the 
former would be seen as more portable and hence provide higher benefits to job changers. 
Education may proxy for financial literacy, since more years of education may expose people to 
more financial knowledge and help them understand investment risk. If so, we predict that more 
educated employees would be more likely to switch to the DC plan. In this firm, the DB-covered 
workers had an option to save pre-tax money in an SRA, a retirement saving vehicle with DC 
characteristics. It is possible that those who were investing in the SRA prior to 2000 would also 
better understand the DC choice, compared to those without SRA saving, and their familiarity 
with DC plans might make them more likely to switch to the DC plan. On the other hand, such 
employees might also want to diversify by holding both a DB and DC plan, so it is an empirical 
question as to how existing SRA saving influenced plan selection outcomes. Finally, we include 
bargaining unit to proxy for peer effects, whereby pension decisions might be influenced by 
colleagues with more contacts (Duflo and Saez, 2002).  
Our first empirical model of the switch decision is therefore described as follows, with 
Prob (DC) set equal to 1 if the employee selected the DC plan and 0 otherwise:     
1)  ,()(  Prob ecFactorsDemographictorsEconomicFafDC iii += . 
Here, the vector Economic Factors includes the projected benefit difference (DC-DB), salary, 
the existence of SRA saving, and the amount of accrued DB benefits. The vector Demographic 
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Factors includes the worker’s age, sex, service, education, risk aversion, ethnicity, and 
bargaining unit.   
Table 3 shows the empirical results. Column 1 reports salary and service years, while 
Column 2 contains only the accrued DB benefit and vested indicator to explore these variables’ 
pure effects. The accrued DB benefit is a function of salary and service, equaling 1.25 percent 
times of the product of salary and service. We focus first on the economic factors. Salary is 
positively correlated with the switch to the DC plan; switched employees earned on average 
$29,000 annually versus $27,000 for the stayers. The positive link between salary and switch 
may come from the liquidity constraint and investment risk tolerance discussed above. 
Employees with an SRA account are more likely to switch to the DC plan. This may be because 
familiarity with a DC model enhanced its appeal, or it could be the result of the bull market over 
the 1990s, making employees feel more optimistic about DC plan savings. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, age is negatively and significantly linked to the switch decision, meaning that 
younger employees are more likely to switch to the DC plan. Service is negatively correlated 
with the switch decision, meaning that employees with fewer years of service are more likely to 
switch to the DC plan. This is because more years of service could entitle an employee to higher 
backloaded DB benefits, creating an incentive for the employee to stay with the DB plan 
(consistent with Childs et al., 2002). The negative relationship could also be due to employee 
self selection, i.e., employees with longer service could be most satisfied with their jobs and thus 
unlikely to leave the employer before retirement. Women and Whites are less likely to stay with 
the DB plan, and education has no separate effect. Interestingly, there is evidence that unionized 
employees are more likely to stay with the DB plan, which may stem from the peer effect 
reported in Duflo and Saez (2002). Column 2 shows the influence of accrued DB benefits and 
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vesting.  Consistent with Childs et al.(2002), employees with lower accrued  DB benefits are 
more likely to switch to the DC plan. Vested employees are more likely to switch to the DC plan 
than the non-vested employees.19 
Table 3 here 
The projected benefit difference between the DC and DB plans at the age of 65, (DC-
DB)65,20 also affects plan election, as shown in Column 3 of Table 3. These projected benefit 
computations developed by the employee use a consistent set of assumptions for all workers, 
including 7 percent investment return, 3 percent wage increase, and age 65 retirement for each 
employee. Surprisingly, we find that the projected benefit difference has a negative influence on 
employee switch decisions, meaning that an employee is less likely to switch to the DC plan if he 
expected more benefits from the DC plan. This counter-intuitive finding suggests that some 
employees might not have made their plan switch decision based on the projected benefit 
differences supplied by the employer. We believe this counter-intuitive result might arise for 
several reasons. First, the benefit differences were computed by the employer at a specific future 
point (e.g., at retirement age 65). Nevertheless, workers might have non-zero turnover possibility 
every year; in fact, the firm’s 1999 DB plan actuarial report assumed a 7.2 percent termination 
rate for employees in their 30s, 5.2 percent for those in their 40s, 2.6 percent for 50s, and 0.1 
percent for 60s and above. Second, the projected benefits calculations assumed everyone vested 
in the DB plan, yet young employees with a higher probability of job termination might not vest. 
Consequently, the projected DB benefits would have been overestimated for some. Third, the 
plan sponsor assumed DC investment return of 7 percent, which might have differed from 
investment returns assumed by the employees in arriving at their plan switch decisions.21  
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To partially mitigate these problems, we next turn to an Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 
calculation to investigate how the IRR might have affected employee plan selection. Previous 
behavioral research suggests that people tend to regard what they think they already have as a 
reference point, given an alternative choice.22 Accordingly, an individual might not accept an 
alternative option unless it provided a benefit no less generous than the status quo.  In our case, 
the DB benefit might have served as the benchmark for the DC plan, so an employee might have 
switched to the DC plan only if he believed that he had a low projected DB benefit benchmark. 
To allow for such a reference effect, we calculate an IRR for each employee, defined as the 
investment return that would equate projected DB and DC benefits. We then use this as a 
regressor in the above empirical model, replacing the benefit difference, to see how this IRR 
threshold influenced employee plan choices.  Moreover, in calculating each IRR, we take into 
account each employee’s vesting status as well as the probability that the employee might change 
jobs in the future. The fact that the DC plan is portable means that a terminated employee’s 
benefit could be rolled over and reinvested, potentially protecting it from inflation; as a result, 
the projected DC benefit provided by the sponsor would be underestimated. Accordingly, when 
calculating IRRs, we incorporate the turnover rate reported in the employer’s defined benefit 
plan annual actuarial report in 1999. 
To solve for the IRR, we first note that the expected present value of the DB benefit 
expressed as a present value at the worker’s current age is given by: 
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and a is the age in 2000; t is the age at point of evaluation; tθ  represents the employee’s 
expected turnover rate at age t conditional on working at age a; Bt is the annuity benefit that one 
has accrued if he leaves the firm at age t; 0s  is the employee’s years of service as of 2000; w is 
the expected wage growth rate of 3 percent; and ServiceYearst is the employee’s tenure as of age 
t. The Annuity Factor at age 65, 65AF , is calculated from the probability of being alive at age t, 
which is mt , and the discount rate r (at 7 percent), assuming everyone dies by age 110 as in the 
mortality table: 
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The expected present value of the DC plan benefit flowing from the employer’s 
contribution can be calculated as:23 
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where BC is the basic DC contribution by the employer, tied to the employee’s age; MC is the 
employer’s dollar-for-dollar match up to 5 percent of the employee’s contribution; and 
aAccruedDB _ is the employee’s accrued DB plan benefit given his current age. Note that in the 
DC plan policy there is no employer match if the employee’s service is shorter than a year, so 
BCj=MCj=0 if 10 <+− saj . 
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The IRR can be calculated by equating projected DB and DC benefits: 
[ ] [ ])()( DCPVEDBPVE = . 
We predict that the lower the IRR, the more likely the employee will choose to switch to the DC 
plan. 
On average, the IRR was around 9 percent for all employees, and the average IRR of 
switchers was much lower than that of stayers: 7 percent and 14 percent respectively. These 
numbers support our hypothesis that employees with lower IRRs were more likely to switch to 
the DC plan, since it would have been easier for them to meet and exceed the DB benchmark. 
This hypothesis is further supported by multivariate analysis controlling on economic and 
demographic factors. For example, Column 4 of Table 3 shows that the IRR is significantly 
negatively associated with an employee’s switch decision. In other words, employees with lower 
IRR are more likely to switch to the DC plan.  
 In summary, we find that both the economic and the demographic factors influenced the 
switch decision. Employees with higher salary, less accrued benefits, and other DC plan saving 
are more likely to switch to the DC plan. Employees also select the DC plan if it is easy for them 
to catch up to the DB plan benefit, proxied by the internal rate of return. Yet using the 
employer’s projected benefit difference between DC and DB plan, (DC-DB)65, produces counter-
intuitive results, probably because this variable does not reflect several important factors that 
could have influenced plan switch decisions. We also find that young, female, short-tenured, 
White, and non-unionized employees are more likely to switch to the DC plan. 
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3.2 The Default Effect 
We next explore whether employees actively electing the DB plan differed from those defaulting 
to the DB plan, what are the opportunity costs of defaulting, and why many young employees 
defaulted to the DB plan rather than switching to the DC plan. 
 
3.2.1 The Differences between DB Defaulters and DB Choosers   
When the company offered the new plan, it specified that any employee who did not 
inform the Human Resources Department of his plan choice prior to June 1, 2000 forfeited his 
one-time opportunity to join the DC plan and defaulted to the DB plan until terminating 
employment. Thus any employee who wanted to stay with the DB plan could end up in that 
position via two different routes: either by filling out the Special Retirement Plan Election Form 
and mailing it back to the Human Resources Department, or by doing nothing and defaulting into 
the DB plan.  
We next evaluate whether the defaulters were different from those who made active 
decisions. The null hypothesis is: 
H0: Employees who defaulted into the DB plan are similar to those who actively chose 
the DB plan.  
The following empirical model is employed to explore the differences between active DB 
electors and DB defaulters:  
( ) 2  ,)(Pr ecFactorsDemographictorsEconomicFafDefaultob iii += , 
where Default equals 1 if the employee defaulted to the DB plan and 0 if he actively elected the 
DB plan. The model is estimated using probit analysis. If the null hypothesis is accepted, the 
coefficients/partial effects should not be significant individually and jointly; however, if the two 
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groups differ from each other, we will find the coefficients/partial effects jointly and individually 
significant. The EconomicFactors and DemographicFactors are the same as those we used 
above in the switch decision analysis. 
Table 4 reports the comparisons between employees who actively elected the DB plan 
versus those who defaulted to the DB plan. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 show that many 
variables are statistically significantly different from 0. For instance, younger, shorter-tenured, 
and male employees are more likely to default into the DB plan; compared to Whites, all other 
ethnic groups are more likely to default. Employees with SRA saving and higher accrued DB 
benefits are less likely to default to the DB plan, which seems to suggest that defaulting 
employees are less interested in retirement savings on the whole. Although there is a negative 
relationship between income and DB defaulting, the result is not statistically significant after 
controlling on other variables. The Wald Chi squares of both probit analyses are much higher 
than the critical value at the 1 percent level, meaning that the explanatory variables are jointly 
significant at the 1 percent level.   In summary, the null hypothesis is rejected, meaning that at 
least some of the employees defaulting to the DB plan differ from those actively electing the DB 
plan.  
Table 4 here 
Column 3 shows how the projected benefit difference at age 65, (DC-DB)65, is associated 
with default behavior controlling on other economic and demographic variables. The result 
shows that the DB defaulters tended to have a higher projected benefit difference than did the 
DB choosers, indicating that the defaulters potentially could obtain higher benefits had they 
switched to the DC plan. One might argue that these projected benefits may not capture the 
actual influence of plan differences, since the calculation ignores vesting, turnover rates, and 
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investment risk as mentioned above. In Column 4, we therefore take into account these factors 
using the IRR, and we find that the DB defaulters on average would benefit more from the DC 
plan: the IRRs of defaulters are lower than those of DB choosers, suggesting that it is easier for 
the defaulters’ DC benefits to catch up to the DB plan benchmarks than it is for the DB 
choosers’. Hence, the results on both (DC-DB)65 and IRR show that compared with the DB 
choosers, the DB defaulters would do better in a DC plan. Consistent with Column 1 and 
Column 2, we find males, non-Whites, and employees with other DC saving are more likely to 
default to the DB plan.  
 
3.2.2 The Similarities Between DB Choosers and DC Switchers  
We have found that the DB defaulters were not very similar to the DB choosers, which 
suggests that at least some employees defaulted to the DB plan for reasons different from those 
driving the DB choosers. In fact, if we go back to examine the variable descriptions in Table 2, it 
is surprising to find that the DB defaulters appear more similar to DC switchers than DB 
choosers. The average age of DB defaulters is 38, closer to that of DC switchers at 40 than to 
that of DB choosers at 53; further, the average salary of DB defaulters is $26,100, closer to that 
of DC switchers at $28,700 than to that of DB choosers at $31,200; the same pattern is also 
found for service years. Since age, salary, and service are the major determinants of projected 
DB and DC plan benefits, it appears that the DB defaulters are more similar to the DC switchers. 
On average, the projected benefit difference of DB defaulters is positive at $5,820 (even higher 
than that of DC switchers at $2,680), indicating that on average the DB defaulters would do 
better if they had switched to the DC plan. By contrast, the average projected benefit difference 
of DB choosers is negative at -$1,480, meaning that on average the DB choosers would benefit 
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more from remaining in the DB plan. The internal rate of return of the DB defaulters, at 10 
percent, is closer to that of DC switchers at 7 percent, rather than that of DB choosers at 21 
percent. Figure 3 shows the distribution of IRR for different groups of employees. Plan choices 
of both DB choosers and DC switchers are sensitive to the economic incentives in the direction 
consistent with our intuition; at each selected percentile point, the DB choosers have much 
higher IRRs than the DC switchers. When focusing on the DB defaulters, we see that their IRRs 
are obviously close to, yet a little bit lower than, those of DC switchers at most of the selected 
percentile points (except at the 90th percentile point).  
Figure 3 here 
To test whether the DB defaulters are similar to the DC choosers, we next examine the 
predicted switch probabilities of each group. We first run a probit model on all active electors 
with the dependent variable set to 1 if the employee was a DC switcher and 0 if he was a DB 
chooser. Explanatory variables are the same as those in Column 1 of Tables 3 and 4.  Then, using 
the coefficients from the probit model, we predict the switch probabilities of all employees, 
including the active electors and the DB defaulters. As shown in Figure 4, the average predicted 
switch probability of DB defaulters, at 0.9, is closer to that of DC switchers at 0.92, and far from 
that of DB choosers at 0.69. The same pattern can be found on the medians of the predicted 
switch probabilities. Hence, this analysis implies that if all the defaulters had been forced to 
make an active plan selection, many of them would have chosen the DC plan.   
Figure 4 here 
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3.2.3 The Opportunity Cost of DB Defaulters 
Since the DB defaulters and DB choosers prove to be different from each other, at least 
some of those who could have benefited more from the DC plan gave up something for not 
picking the right plan. Accordingly, we next ask how large the opportunity cost is, i.e., how 
much money the defaulters gave up, by subtracting the present value of projected DB benefits 
from that of projected DC benefits. The equation we have in mind is:  
 )._()_( iii DBBenefitsprojectedPVDCBenefitsprojectedPVyCostOpportunit −=  
Using the employer’s calculation of projected benefits, Panel A of Table 5 shows that the 
present value of the opportunity cost is estimated to be $2,700 in lump sum per capita across all 
defaulting employees. Summing over all defaulters, the cost totals about $3 million, or 9 percent 
of total salary. According to the formula above, the opportunity cost is positive if an employee’s 
projected DC benefits are larger than his projected DB benefits, and negative otherwise. We next 
focus on the subset of DB defaulters who are employees with positive opportunity cost, i.e., 
those whose DC benefits are projected to be greater than their projected DB benefits. On 
average, we estimate that a typical member of this subset gave up a lump sum equivalent to 
$9,300. All together, the DB defaulters with positive opportunity costs left unclaimed $7 million, 
or 37 percent of their annual salary, as a result of not switching to the DC plan. Generally, 
younger employees gave up more than the older employees, partly because younger employees 
had the potential to benefit more from the DC plan because of their longer contribution and 
investment horizons. Table 5 shows that older employees were hurt less by defaulting to the DB 
plan. Panel B of Table 5 shows how the calculations vary if we take into account both the vesting 
rule and turnover rates. We find that the number of employees defaulting and the size of the 
opportunity cost are quite close to those in Panel A. 
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Table 5 here 
3.2.4 Potential Explanations for the Defaulting Effects Young Employees 
Another look at Figure 2 shows a U-shaped default rate across different age groups, i.e., 
the default rate was higher for both very young employees in their 20s and for old employees in 
their 60s, with low default rates for those in the middle.24 The average opportunity cost of 
defaulters younger than 40 years old is a positive $9,300 (in lump sum, in 2000 dollar), while 
that of defaulters older than 40 years old was actually negative at -$9,480.25 It is not surprising to 
have older employees defaulting to the DB plan, because they were presumably aware that 
making no active election would default them into the DB plan, which potentially offered greater 
retirement benefits. More puzzling is why so many young employees (younger than 40 years old) 
also defaulted to the DB plan. Next, we evaluate several potential explanations for young 
employees’ high default rates.  
A first explanation might be that some young employees face liquidity constraints, 
making the contributory DC plan less appealing. In fact, the average annual salary of the young 
defaulters was $25,000, lower than that of the DC switchers ($27,000) and DB choosers 
($29,000). If, at the extreme, the young defaulters would contribute nothing to the DC plan, and 
hence would be eligible for zero employee match, Panel C of Table 5 shows that the opportunity 
costs of all defaulters would be negative, indicating that the projected expected DB plan benefit 
would exceed the DC plan benefit. Although the liquidity constraints could help explain the 
default behavior of some employees, it is unlikely to explain the behavior of all young 
employees. Previous studies on DC plan saving found that saving rates increase with employee 
age, salary, and services.26 As an employee ages, liquidity constraints relax, enabling him to save 
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more for retirement. If the same employee faces high job change risk, then defaulting to the DB 
plan would have him forgo the upside potential of the DC plan.  
Second, if the young defaulters are highly risk averse, the DB plan would be more 
attractive than the DC plan. For instance, defaulters might have regarded the DB plan as risk-free 
In this case, they would have also invested their DC accounts in risk-free assets had they 
switched. So the DC portfolio return would be too low for the DC benefits to catch up to the DB 
benchmark. Panel D of  Table 5 shows that if the DC portfolio had been invested entirely in risk-
free assets, earning a 4 percent annual return, the opportunity cost for the DB defaulters would be 
negative (with a 4 percent discount rate). Of course, the risk aversion argument might explain 
some defaulters’ choices, but it is unlikely that it was binding to all of them. One reason is that 
the “risk-free” feature of the DB plan is a misperception. Although this DB plan is “free” of 
default risk (the probability of this firm going bankrupt is very small), the employer may still 
shut down the DB plan or change the benefit formula in the future. Further, there is no evidence 
that the young DB defaulters were more risk-averse than the young DC switchers or DB 
choosers. In fact, when we impute their risk aversion coefficients using the empirical technique 
developed by Halek (2002), the DB defaulters were less risk averse than the DC switchers.  
   Third, the high default rate by young employees could be a result of their not paying 
attention. Previous studies have found that many young employees are not very interested in 
retirement saving, but the older they become, the more they are involved. Accordingly, one 
explanation for the default behavior of some young employees could be that they did not pay 
attention to the choice, or the opportunity cost was not high enough to arouse their interest. 
Lacking individual interviews or surveys, we cannot judge the importance of inattention.  
  
28
Fourth, procrastination could also be a potential explanation for young employees’ high 
default rate. Several analysts have found that automatic enrollment has a powerful effect on 
401(k) saving behavior. In particular, Madrain and Shea (2001) and Choi et al. (2004) report that 
younger employees, women, and employees with shorter tenure and lower income are more 
likely to procrastinate, by retaining both the default contribution rate and the default allocation. If 
young employees tend to procrastinate more than older ones, having the DB be the default may 
explain why so many DB defaulters were young. 
 
3.3 Saving by Switched Employees 
 Employees who switched to the DC plan faced two key decisions: how much to 
contribute to the plan, and how to allocate funds across the available investment options. Both 
decisions can have a profound impact on accumulated plan balances at the time of retirement, 
and hence they can greatly influence retiree income. Therefore we next describe how we analyze 
the links between DC plan contributions and employee characteristics.  
Prior studies have concluded that employees’ DC plan contribution rates tend to increase 
with age, for any given salary group.27 Two explanations have been provided for this 
phenomenon. First, some employees seek to smooth consumption over the life-cycle. Younger 
employees save less because of school expenses, house loans, and the expenses of raising a 
family. In contrast, older employees tend to have lower financial burdens. Second, many 
individuals find it difficult to make long-term plans. Munnell, Sunden, and Taylor (2000) support 
this theory, reporting that shorter planning horizons reduced participant contribution rates. 
Several empirical studies also find a positive link between age and DC plan contribution rates 
(Clark and Schieber, 1998; Papke, 2003; Huberman, Iyengar, and Jiang 2004). Consequently, we 
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predict that age is positively associated with contribution rates. Salary is also an important 
determinant of retirement savings; some low earners might face liquidity constraints, making 
saving less likely (Goodfellow and Schieber, 1997; Clark and Schieber, 1998;   Huberman, 
Iyengar, and Jiang 2003). Therefore we hypothesize a positive link between salary levels and 
contribution rates. More years of service and higher education can help employees realize the 
importance of retirement saving; therefore, these two also would be expected to correlate 
positively with DC contribution rates. It is not a clear priori how SRA savings should affect DC 
contribution rates. On one hand, an employee with SRA saving might simply have a higher 
marginal saving rate, and therefore he would be more likely to have greater DC contributions. 
On the other hand, SRA saving might reduce interest in the DC plan if the employee regarded his 
retirement saving as sufficient. Which factor dominates is an empirical question to be explored 
below. We also hypothesize that there may be peer effects, so that one’s bargaining unit could 
influence employee DC saving decisions.  
 Because of the regulation of the IRS tax code and the employer’s restriction, employee 
combined total annual contributions under the DC plan and the SRA generally cannot exceed the 
lesser of $10,500 or 20 percent of salary. Hence, employees are capped regarding their 
contribution capability. In our dataset, few employees were capped by $10,500, so we mainly 
focus on the 20 percent cap. Conditional on participation, the empirical model linking these 
variables is as following:  
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where *DCR  is the desired contribution rate. Both OLS and tobit regression are employed to 
estimate the results.  
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Switched employees’ pre-tax contribution rates to the DC plan and SRA averaged 6 
percent of their base salary. If we also take into account the employer basic and matching 
contributions, the total contribution rate averaged 12.6 percent. Figure 5 shows the distribution of 
employee pre-tax contribution rates. Only around 3 percent of switchers contributed nothing to 
the DC account, making them eligible for only the employer’s basic contribution; 28 percent of 
the switchers obtained some employer match contribution but did not exhaust the 5 percent 
employer match cap. The contribution rates of a large number of the switched employees – 42 
percent – clustered at 5 percent, the employer match cap. This last result is consistent with 
Kusko, and Wilcox (1998), and Choi et al. (2002), showing the importance of the employer’s 
match cap. The remaining 27 percent of employees saved more than 5 percent of salary.  
Figure 5 here 
 Table 6 shows how employee characteristics are associated with employee pre-tax 
saving, exclusive of the employer’s basic and match contributions. Consistent with Clark and 
Schieber (1998) and Papke (2003), we find that age is positively correlated with employee 
contribution rates; older employees apparently care more about retirement savings and tend to 
contribute more than younger employees. The link between salary and contribution rate is 
positively significant, suggesting that high-income employees save more than low-income 
employees, consistent with previous studies (Goodfellow and Schieber, 1997; Clark and 
Schieber, 1998; Huberman, Iyengar, and Jiang 2003). In our empirical results, service, sex, and 
education level do not affect employee DC plan savings. We do find ethnicity matters: African 
Americans tend to save less than Whites, while other ethnicities saved more (including Asian-
Americans and Native Americans and Hispanics). We also find that employees with an SRA 
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account and more accrued DB benefits before the switch tended to save more, meaning that 
employees with higher saving propensity in one setting also save more in other settings.  
Table 6 here 
 
3.4 Employer Contribution Expenses 
 After analyzing employee plan choices as well as the saving rates of the switchers, one 
might wonder how employee behavior influenced the employer’s total expenses.28 We focus here 
only on the impact of switched employees, since there is no predicted change in benefit expenses 
as a result of those who remained in the DB plan. To see whether the employer ended up paying 
more or less, we compare the present value of anticipated DB expenses had no switch occurred 
with those given the switch. As a benchmark case, we first estimate a conservative expense 
measure, assuming that all switched employees remained with the employer until retirement. In 
that case, the expense due to a switcher equals the expense of what the employer would have 
paid if the worker had remained in the DB plan: this is the present value of his DB benefit: 
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where i represents the ith participant; ai is the worker’s current age;  r is the discount rate set at 7 
percent; T is the retirement age set at 65; w is the expected wage growth rate of 3 percent; and 
ServiceYeariT is the employee i’s tenure as of age T. The Annuity Factor at age 65, 65AF , is 
calculated as above.  
 The DC expense of a switched employee is represented by the present value of the DC 
plan basic and match contributions, plus his accrued DB benefits:  
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where BCij and MCij are the basic contribution and match contribution for participant i at his age 
j, and 
ia
AccruedDB _  is the participant i’s accrued DB benefit at his current age ai.  
 By comparing ExpenseDB with ExpenseDC, we can ascertain the employer’s expenses 
from the DB and DC plans. Since not all employees would have actually remained at the firm 
until retirement, we also provide expense saving estimates that take into account non-zero 
turnover rates.  
To explore the most expensive case, we first assume every employee would have stayed 
until retirement. Here, projected expenses are discounted to (2000 dollar) using a discount rate of 
7 percent, consistent with the plan sponsor’s assumptions. The results first illustrate projected 
changes in employer expenses assuming that (a) all switched employees contributed at least 5 
percent of pay, to get the full employer match, and (b) turnover rates were zero. As shown in 
Table 7, assuming no turnover, the average projected DB plan expense per employee was 
$49,160, and the per employee projected DC plan expense was quite close, $48,750. Given 
actual DC switch patterns and contribution rates, however, however, the average expense of each 
employee was lower, at $46, 210, because one-fifth of the employees contributed less than 5 
percent. When these employer expenses are summed up to calculate total expenses, we find that 
the total DB expense for the 1,610 employees who switched would have been a projected $79 
million dollars (171 percent of annual salary), in contrast to the projected $78.5 million (169 
percent of annual salary) assuming all employees took a full match, or $74.4 million (161 
percent of annual salary) based on actual employee contributions and no turnover. Therefore, the 
employer’s benefit expenses would have been projected to fall if half of its eligible workforce 
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switched to the DC plan and no one left before retirement. Allowing for turnover, the changes in 
benefit expenses were lower, since the employer has no obligation to make contributions for 
terminated employees. In this second case, the present value of the DB expense would have been 
$52.3 million (113 percent of annual salary), very close to actual DC contributions of $52.8 
million (114 percent of annual salary), but lower than the case of a 5 percent match for 
everybody of $55.2 million (119 percent of annual salary). In other words, given the actual 
behavior of employees who switched, there was virtually no change in employer total pension 
expenses after the switch. 
Table 7 here 
 
Conclusions 
This paper employs a unique dataset to explore employee decisions to switch from a DB 
to a DC plan, the effect of default options, and the saving behavior of employees who switched 
into the DC plan. Our research helps understand how employees made one of their most 
important financial decisions, choosing a proper retirement plan, and how the different features 
of the DB and DC plans influenced employee choices. The analysis shows that younger, female, 
and higher-income workers as well as those with less service were more likely to choose a DC 
plan. Previous benefits also influenced plan choices: employees with lower accrued DB benefits 
or some previous DC savings were more likely to choose the DC plan. After incorporating 
positive turnover rates into an internal rate of return calculation, we find that employees with 
lower internal returns were more likely to choose the DC plan. This means that an employee 
chose a DC plan when he expected that it would be easy for him to meet or exceed the DB plan 
projected benefit.  
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We also find that the default option can have an important impact on retirement choices. 
Surprisingly, about half of young employees who could potentially benefit more from the DC 
plan defaulted to the DB plan, and the DB defaulters were more similar to the DC switchers than 
the DB choosers. According to the employer’s calculation, altogether the defaulted employees 
with positive opportunity costs gave up $7M, or 37 percent of their annual salary.  
 For those who switched into the DC plan, the 5 percent plan match cap strongly affected  
DC plan saving rates: more than 40 percent of them saved at exactly 5 percent, and only 30 
percent contributed more than 5 percent of salary. Older employees and employees with higher 
incomes tended to have higher contribution rates. The DC participants with an SRA account 
before the switch tended to save more, meaning that employees with a higher saving propensity 
in one form consistently save more for retirement in another form. We also find saving 
differences among different ethnicities: African-Americans saved less than Whites, but other 
ethnicities (Asian-Americans, Native-Americans, and Hispanics) saved more than Whites.   
 Several policy implications flow from this paper. If a Social Security reform allowed 
workers to redirect some of their payroll tax to an individual account, our findings suggest that 
the employee’s characteristics, including age, salary, service, sex, and ethnicity, will have an 
impact on his probability of setting up an account. Moreover, having had past experience with a 
DC plan also influences the probability of adopting such an account. Policymakers should also 
contemplate what the default options, if any, should be to realize particular policy objectives. If 
the policy objective were to encourage young workers to set up individual accounts, the default 
should be the new individual account instead of the old DB plan. Another implication pertains to 
employee education. We believe that the high switch rate of 50 percent at this employer was 
partly due to market timing, but it was also the result of extensive employer communication 
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about plan features and projected benefits. Consequently, employee education appears to be very 
important in retirement saving  
In future work, we hope to evaluate how the switched employees allocated their 
retirement assets, and whether saving rates and asset allocation changed over time. Another 
interesting question is whether actual DC plan payouts proved to be higher or lower than the 
projected DB benefits forecasted at the switch date. We will also calculate projected DC benefits 
based on actual rather than hypothetical contribution rates and asset allocations, to evaluate 
whether switchers’ DC benefits based on actual portfolios will exceed projected DB benefits at 
the time of the policy change.  
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 Table 1. Comparison of DB and DC Plan Characteristics. 
 
 DB Plan DC Plan Dominant Plan 
Investment Choices Participants have no control 
over the investment of pension 
money. 
Usually participants make 
their investment decisions.1 
DC 
Investment Risk  Participants do not need to 
bear investment risk. 
Participants have to bear all 
investment risk. 
DB 
Investment Returns Participants can only collect 
the benefits defined in the DB 
formula even if the investment 
has favorable returns. 
Participants are entitled to all 
investment returns. 
Not clear2 
Termination and 
Portability 
Participants leaving their job 
forfeit future indexation of 
benefits already accrued. 
Participants could rollover and 
keep investing investment 
savings. 
DC 
Incentives Participants have greater 
incentive to sustain a high 
level of effort over the entire 
career in order to achieve a 
high career-end salary. 
Participants have  less 
incentive over their entire life 
than in the DB plan since their 
DC benefits depend upon the 
wage trajectory over their  
entire life 
DB 
Wage-Path Risk Benefits tied to wage used in 
the formula, mostly the final 
wage. 
Benefits tied to career average 
earnings. 
Not clear3 
Life Annuity Usually offers life annuity 
with favorable mortality rates  
Most DC plans’ distribution is 
lump sum. Participants might 
face unfavorable mortality rate 
when purchasing annuity in 
market due to adverse 
selection problem. 
DB 
Source: Author’s summary extending Bodie, Marcus, and Merton (1988). 
 
Notes:  
1. Papke (2003) mentioned that 82 percent of 34 million participants in 401(k) plans had some control 
over their investments in 1997. 
2. Since DC participants bear investment risk, participants have the potential to have DC benefits exceed 
DB if they make correct choices. But it is also possible that DC benefits could be lower than DB 
benefit if the participants make wrong investment decisions. 
3. On one hand, DB benefits tied to final wage could provide employees with a type of income-
maintained insurance not available to those in the DC plan. On the other hand, if wage paths are 
unpredictable, it might be very risky to tie one’s pension benefits to the final wage. 
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Table 2. Sample Economic and Demographic Characteristics  
 
Variable  Unit Sample 
Average 
DB 
Choosers 
DC 
Switchers 
DB 
Defaulters 
(DC-DB)65 Benefit difference between 
DC and DB plan if 
employee stays with 
employer until 65 
$K 3.29 -1.48 2.68 5.82 
IRR with 
Turnover 
Internal Rate of Return with 
turnover rate 
% 0.09 0.21 0.07 0.10 
SRA99 Other DC savings (pre 
2000) 
0/1 0.18 0.29 0.25 0.08 
Risk Averse Risk aversion Num 1.43 1.32 1.53 1.44 
Accrued DB Accrued DB benefit as of 
2000 
$K 3.06 
 
6.05 2.92 2.21 
Age Age Num 41 53 40 38 
Salary Salary $K 27.7 31.3 28.7 26.1 
Service Year of service Num 9 16 8 7 
Male Male 0/1 0.41 0.36 0.36 0.45 
Degree At least college degree 0/1 0.25 0.20 0.28 0.26 
eth_AfricanAm African American 0/1 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.38 
eth_Other Other ethnicity (Hispanic, 
Asian-American, and Native 
American) 
0/1 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.05 
Union Unionized 0/1 0.28 0.38 0.23 0.29 
Vested Vested 0/1 0.57 0.88 0.57 0.43 
Observations   3474 220 1701 1169 
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Table 3. Determinants of Employee Choice between DB and DC Plans 
                (Dependent Variable: 1=DC, 0=DB) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Economic Factors     
(DC-DB)65   -0.006**  
   [0.001]  
IRR    -1.191** 
    [0.273] 
Salary 0.009**    
 [0.002]    
Accrued DB  -0.016**   
  [0.005]   
SRA99 0.211** 0.210** 0.178** 0.235** 
 [0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.023] 
Demographic Factors     
Age -0.005** -0.004**   
 [0.001] [0.001]   
Service -0.006**    
 [0.002]    
Male -0.103** -0.071** -0.072** -0.087** 
 [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.025] 
Degree -0.016 0.003 0.034 -0.018 
 [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] 
eth_AfricanAm -0.083** -0.118** -0.118** -0.121** 
 [0.022] [0.022] [0.021] [0.022] 
eth_other -0.047 -0.063 -0.037 -0.068 
 [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.044] 
Union -0.104** -0.134** -0.150** -0.124** 
 [0.023] [0.024] [0.023] [0.024] 
Vested  0.127**   
    [0.027]     
Observations 3090 3039 3061 3037 
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.11 
Note: 1.Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percen 
          2. Missing value dummies included, but not reported here.  
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Table 4. Differences between DB Defaulters and DB Choosers 
                 (Dependent Variable: 1=DB Defaulter, 0=DB Chooser) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Economic Factors     
(DC-DB)65   0.014**  
   [0.001]  
IRR    -0.075* 
    [0.035] 
Salary -0.002    
 [0.001]    
Accrued DB  -0.012**   
  [0.003]   
SRA99 -0.088** -0.067* -0.115** -0.171** 
 [0.031] [0.029] [0.032] [0.037] 
Demographic Factors     
Age -0.006** -0.006**   
 [0.001] [0.001]   
Service -0.005**    
 [0.001]    
Male 0.047* 0.050* 0.051** 0.081** 
 [0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.023] 
Degree 0.007 -0.012 -0.007 0.044* 
 [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] 
eth_AfricanAm 0.057** 0.055** 0.065** 0.072** 
 [0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.018] 
eth_other 0.080** 0.077** 0.080** 0.109** 
 [0.016] [0.014] [0.016] [0.015] 
Union 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.032 
 [0.018] [0.018] [0.017] [0.022] 
Vested  -0.03   
    [0.023]     
Observations 1389 1345 1376 1345 
R-squared 0.27 0.29 0.23 0.14 
Note: 1.Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent 
          2. Missing value dummies included, but not reported here.  
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Table 5.  Opportunity Cost of DB Defaulters (Discounted to 2000 dollar) 
      )_()_( iii DBBenefitsprojectedPVDCBenefitsprojectedPVyCostOpportunit −=  
 
 # of Obs. Average (K$) Total (M$)  % of Annual Salary 
Panel A: Base Case1 
All Defaulters 1142 2.7 3.1 9% 
Defaulters with Positive 
Opportunity Costs 730 9.3 6.8 37% 
Age 20-30 412 11.4 4.7 48% 
Age 31-40 273 7.3 2 28% 
Age 41-50 45 2.6 0.1 9% 
                  Age 51+ 0 0 0   
  
Panel B: Including Expected Turnover 
All Defaulters 1142 3.3 3.8 13% 
Defaulters with Positive 
Opportunity Costs 791 8.4 6.6 34% 
Age 20-30 412 9.7 4 41% 
Age 31-40 300 8 2.4 31% 
Age 41-50 79 3.2 0.3 13% 
                  Age 51+ 0 0 0   
  
Panel C: Including Expected Turnover, and 0 Employer Match (Liquidity Constraints) 
All Defaulters 1142 -27.21 -31.07 -104% 
Defaulters with Positive 
Opportunity Costs 0 0 0   
Panel D: Including Expected Turnover, and 4% Investment Return and Discount Rate 
(Highly Risk Averse)  
All Defaulters 1142 -21.18 -8.9 -81.3% 
Defaulters with Positive 
Opportunity Costs 0 0 0   
Note: 1. Base case assumptions: match contribution=5%, investment return=7%, discount rate=7%, 
wage growth=3%, and no turnover 
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Table 6. Effects of DC Switcher Characteristics on DC Plan Contributions 
 
 OLS Tobit 
Economic Factors   
Salary 0.036* 0.036* 
 [0.015] [0.016] 
SRA99 0.031** 0.031** 
 [0.002] [0.002] 
Demographic Factors   
Age 0.071** 0.073** 
 [0.012] [0.011] 
Male 0.003 0.003 
 [0.002] [0.002] 
Degree 0.245 0.256 
 [0.239] [0.232] 
Service -0.021 -0.021 
 [0.018] [0.016] 
eth_AfricanAm -0.008** -0.008** 
 [0.002] [0.002] 
eth_Other 0.012* 0.012** 
 [0.005] [0.004] 
Union -0.004 -0.004 
 [0.004] [0.004] 
Observations 1606 1606 
R-squared  0.22 0.043 
Note: 1.Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent 
          2. Missing value dummies included, but not reported here.  
          3. Pseudo R-squared from Tobit analysis. 
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Table 7. Present Value of Employer Pension Expenses (In 2000 dollar) 
 
 No Turnover  With Turnover 
 
Per Employee  
($) 
Total  
($M) 
% of EE 
Salary  
Per Employee  
($) 
Total  
($M) 
% of EE 
Salary 
DB expense 49,160 79.14 171%  32,510 52.35 113% 
DC expense with 
5% match 48,750 78.49 169%  34,280 55.19 119% 
DC expense with 
actual match  46,210 74.4 161%  32,790 52.8 114% 
Source: Author’s calculation     
Note: discount rate=7%, and wage growth=3%. 
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Figure 1: Employee Plan Choices 
 
 
 Source: Author’s tabulation. 
 
 
Figure 2. Employee Plan Choices by Age 
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Figure 3: Internal Rate of Return vs. Plan Choice 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
Figure 4: Predicted Switch Probabilities 
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Figure 5: Distribution of DC Contribution Rates among Employees Who Switched 
 
 
Source: Author’s tabulation. 
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Appendix 1: The Sample Illustration of Annual Retirement Benefits
Firm Name
Illustration of Annual Retirement Benefits
Retirement DB vs. DC  Plan
Assumptions:
Prepared for: Age in Calendar Year 2000: 31
Name Age Benefits Begin: 65
Address Current Annual Salary: $24,000
Years of Prior DB Service: 1
Investment Rate of Return: 7.00%
Future Salary Increase Rate: 3.00%
Employee Contribution Rate: 5.00%
Estimated Annual DB Benefit
Payable at Age 65 (See Notes 1 and 2): 267$                 
Annual Retirement Benefit at Age 65 Annual Retirement Benefit at Age 65
if You Terminate Employment Assuming Continued
Option Plan at the End of an Additional: Employment to Retirement
(A) (B) (C) (D)
10 Years 15 Years 20 Years
                   (Amounts shown below are Employer contributions only)
Remain in DB DB Benefit (Notes 1 & 2) $4,062 $6,850 $10,422 $26,273
Join DC Plan Total DC + DB Benefit $14,628 $20,608 $25,551 $35,289
      Estimated DB Benefit (Notes 1&2) $267 $267 $267 $267
      Basic DC Benefit (Note 3) $5,478 $8,136 $10,333 $14,661
      Matching DC Plan (Note 4) $8,883 $12,205 $14,951 $20,361
Calculation Notes: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
Note: The projected benefits shown above are based on various assumptions. Actual benefits may be higher or lower.
Projected benefits shown below are based on various assumptions.  Actual benefits may be higher or lower.  
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Endnotes 
 
1 In the United States, the number of employer-sponsored DC plans increased from 331,000 in 
1979 to 674,000 in 1998, while the number of defined benefit plans decreased from 140,000 to 
56,000. Meanwhile, DC plans have enlarged their coverage from 18 million employees in 1979 
to 57 million in 1998, while defined benefit DB coverage increased only slightly, from 37 
million to 42 million (USDOL 2001-2002).  
2 See Mitchell (2000) and Fore (2001) for details. 
3 DC plans are attractive to employees because of individual involvement, more investment 
choice, immediate vesting, and portability at job change; employers also like DC plans because 
they are easy to communicate to employees and there is no underfunding risk. 
4 For instance, Bodie, Marcus, and Merton (1988), and McCarthy (2003) find that there are 
trade-offs between DB and DC plans, and so there is no clear dominance. 
5 For example, the three models suggested by the President’s Commission on Social Security 
Reform allow employees to redirect part of their Social Security payroll tax to an individual 
account. See Cogan and Mitchell (2003) for details.   
6 In our case, since the probability of the employer going bankrupt is very small, the default risk 
should not be a big problem for DB participants. Also, the influence of default risk is mitigated 
to some extent by the benefit insurance provided by Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
(PBGC). 
7 This is more likely to happen in the public sector, as in North Carolina State University (Clark, 
Harper, and Pitts, 1997), State Teacher’s Retirement System of Ohio 
(http://www.strsoh.org/newmembers/3.htm), Florida (http://www.frs.state.fl.us/) after June 1, 
2002, and Colorado after January 1, 2006 (http://www.copera.org). 
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8 This happened in both the private and public sectors; c.f. the large electronics employer and a 
large health care employer mentioned by Rappaport (2004), Colorado State Employee’s 
Retirement System (Fore 2001), Florida’s Daytona Beach Community College (Trager, Francis, 
and SigRist, 2001), and the Michigan State Employee Retirement System (Papke, 2004).  
9 In a more sophisticated analysis, Lachance, Mitchell, and Smetters (2003) examined a different 
aspect of the Florida state plan. Not only were employees offered a chance to switch from a DB 
to a DC plan, but they were also granted one subsequent chance to switch back to the old plan. 
That study presents a simulation of the value of the option to buy back the DB benefit, but it did 
not link actual behavior to observed employee characteristics. 
10 Full-time monthly paid employees were participating in a DC plan, in which they had to 
contribute a specified amount of money, choose their own investment, bear the investment risk, 
and receive the accumulated balance. 
11 Employee reactions were reported in the firm’s internal newsletters. 
12 Up to 5 percent of employee contribution went to the match plan, and entitled them to the 
dollar-to-dollar employer match up to 5 percent as described below. An employee’s contribution 
above 5 percent would go to the Simplified Retirement Account, a supplementary DC-type 
retirement saving account offered to all employees.  
13 All newly hired employees meeting participation requirements after the 2000 switch date are 
eligible only for the DC plan.  
14 An additional 384 employees were in the DB plan after the switch, but the dataset did not 
indicate whether they selected the plan or defaulted to it. In the multinomial logit regression 
below in Table 3 and Table 4, those 384 employees are omitted.  
15 Missing values are flagged with a dummy variable and included in all regressions.    
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16 All the benefit amounts provided by the employer to the employee in the Personalized 
Illustration of Annual Retirement Benefits reflected only employer contributions, without taking 
into account employee contributions. The employer’s computations assumed the following: an 
investment return of 7 percent; future annual salary increases of 3 percent; retirement at age 65; 
and employee DC contribution rates of 5 percent. The benefit differences were calculated by 
subtracting the DB annuity amount from the DC annuity amount, which was converted from the 
lump sum under the Single Life Annuity Option. To guarantee comparability between DB and 
DC benefits, DC benefits were assumed to be paid under the Single Life Annuity Option, which 
pays a benefit during the lifetime of the participant only; mortality assumptions were based on 
the Annuity 2000 Table (Merged Gender) with age setback 2 years. The annuity conversion 
interest rate was assumed at 7 percent. The difference between the projected DC and DB benefits 
at age 65 was equal to   [Converted DC annuity65+Accured DBannuity now -DB Annuity65]. 
17 The definition and influence of Internal Rate of Return will be introduced later in this section.  
18 The DB plan is a non-contributory plan, and vested employees were eligible to plan benefits 
without contributing into the plan. In the DC plan, all employees could receive the employer’s 
basic contribution without contributing anything, but to receive employer’s dollar-for-dollar 
match contribution, positive employee contributions were required. Hence, lower-income 
employees facing possible liquidity constraints might not have extra money to make positive 
employee contributions, therefore forfeiting their rights to receive the employer match, which 
would in turn entitle them to fewer benefits in the DC plan than they would have received by 
remaining in the DB plan. Furthermore, the major risk in the DC plan is investment risk: if an 
employee invests in equities instead of in low-risk instruments such as money market funds or 
long-term bond funds, he may lose some of the value of his portfolio. A higher income might 
enable an individual to bear more risk by providing a cushion for bad returns, so we predict that, 
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all else constant, the higher the employee’s salary, the more likely that he would have switched 
to the DC plan. 
19 The vesting policy in our case differs from that of the Michigan State public pension plan 
participants (Papke,  2004). In our case, all the accrued DB benefits of vested employees are 
frozen if they switch to the DC plan. Non-vested employees with at least 5 years’ combined 
service in the DB and the DC plans will vest in the frozen DB benefits accrued as of June 30, 
2000. But if a non-vested employee leaves the employer before completing 5 years, he will 
forfeit his DB benefits. However, in Michigan’s case, all the vested accrued DB benefits could 
be transferred to the DC plan to be indexed to future investment returns. Hence, we would 
predict a smaller influence of vesting in our case than in Michigan’s case.  
20 The unreported analysis shows that the projected benefit differences calculated by assuming 
the employee stays with the employer for an additional 10, 15, and 20 years generates similar 
influences as does (DC-DB)65.   
21 Another important reason for the negative link between (DC-DB) and switch decision is, as we 
will show in the next section, that a large number of young employees, who potentially could 
benefit more from the DC plan than from the DB plan (i.e., higher value of (DC-DB) 65), actually 
defaulted to the DB plan by making no active elections. 
22 See Tversky and Kahneman (1991) and Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991) for details. 
23 In calculating the expected DC benefits, to compare with the non-contributory DB plan 
benefits, we only take into account the employer’s basic and match contribution (at 5 percent of 
match cap), without any employee’s contribution. However, one might say that this is still not 
fair, since the employer’s match is conditional on the employee’s positive contribution. Actually, 
an employee’s voluntary contribution at 5 percent to get 5 percent match could be treated as 
redirecting the employee’s other saving outside of the DB plan before switch (5 percent of pay) 
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to the DC plan. For many employees without liquidity restrictions, contributing 5 percent of pay 
is rational for several reasons. First, the employer match in this case, dollar-for-dollar up to 5 
percent, is relatively generous (the typical match formula in the United States is fifty-cents-per-
dollar up to 6 percent). For many employees, especially the young, the total amount of employee 
compensation, salary plus benefits, may be higher when an employee receives an employer 
match by contributing to the DC plan. Also, employees can get a tax benefit from retirement 
saving, since DC plan contributions and investment returns are tax deferred. In fact, we will see 
in section 3.3 that 70 percent of employees contributed no less than 5 percent, which exhausted 
the entire employer match.   
24 The age distribution of DB defaulters is significantly different from that of the DB choosers. 
Among the defaulters, 62 percent were younger than 40 years old, while only 12 percent of DB 
choosers were younger than 40 years old. 
25 The older employees could obtain more benefits from the DB plan partially because the 
backloading feature of the DB plan favors the long-tenured employees who would stay with the 
employer until retirement, and partially because the DC plan investment period is shorter for the 
old employees to accumulate a high account balance. 
26 See Clark and Schieber (1998), Huberman, Iyengar, and Jiang (2003, 2004), Engelhardt and 
Kumar (2004). 
27 See Holden and VanDerhei (2001) for details.  
28 We have no information on plan administrative cost, so our impact analysis concentrates on 
contribution expenses.  
